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The speed of globalisation has been accelerating in
recent years. China has entered the global stage
and became a member of the WTO. The coastline
area between Beijing and Shanghai belongs to one
of the most booming regions in the world.Low tar-
iffs and negligible transport costs as well as capital
mobility allow production on Chinese territory for
the global market. For Western Europe, more new
competitors have emerged who are even closer –
literally in their front garden. The former commu-
nist countries have overcome their transition crises
in the mid-1990s and are now catching up with the
industrialised world. Market integration with these
regions implies substantial adjustment pressure for
high wage countries.
Many economists and politicians do not see any
problems connected with increased global compe-
tition and praise the gains from globalisation.They
predict welfare gains for all participating countries.
Apart from the fact that not everybody wins and
welfare gains occur on an aggregated national level
only,the crucial underlying assumption is that mar-
kets are flexible. Results of standard trade theories
are based on full employment. How do the results
change, however, if labour markets, say, are rigid?1
As is common knowledge from the factor price
equalisation theorem, trade can have the same
implications as capital mobility and migration. All
three channels basically create a pressure towards
convergence of goods and factor prices. However,
with downwardly rigid wages, unemployment will
be the residual adjustment mechanism. In industri-
alised countries, less skilled workers are typically
affected most from global competition. Conse-
quently, for these income groups real wages have
been falling in the United States within the last
three decades. In some European countries, how-
ever, unemployment rates – especially among the
poorly educated – have been increasing instead.
With regard to national income, globalisation can
in principle also lead to a deterioration of the
aggregate income position if unemployment arises
since fewer factors of production are employed rel-
ative to the situation before.Is globalisation in that
case still beneficial?
This article examines some causal links between
the integration of goods and factor markets and
national labour market outcome. It is organised as
follows: the next section summarises some brief
facts on globalisation within the last decades.
Flexibility of labour markets is analysed across
some major countries in Section 3.Section 4 relates
national labour market outcomes to global compe-
tition.The last section concludes and discusses pol-
icy implications.
Some brief facts on globalisation
Historically, there has already been an era before
World War I when the extent of globalisation was
comparable to contemporary levels. But the Great
Depression and the deterioration of international
relations at the eve of World War II led to a sharp
fall in international trade and factor flows. Glo-
balisation was reversed. Recovery took place only
slowly in the second half of the 20th century.
Since World War II, the integration of commodity
markets has been progressing rapidly.According to
the World Bank (2003), world trade flows as a
share of world GDP have increased from 25 per-
cent in 1971 to 58 percent in 2001. Germany, for
instance, has undergone a similar development. In
1950, the ratio was one fifth of GDP whereas in
2003, it had increased to 56.1 percent.2 Integration
of markets was stimulated by a continuous decline
in trade barriers. GATT and later WTO were
founded for that purpose only.
Migration is nowadays generally more restricted
than it used to be before World War I. Indus-
trialised countries have become target regions and
regulate in detail whom they allow to immigrate.
Labour mobility is either restricted between poor
and rich countries or very low as in the European
internal market.Thus, it is inadequate to talk about
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a world labour market. However, migration flows
have been peaking in the 1990s again.The share of
the foreign-born labour force relative to the entire
labour force has been increasing in all major
OECD countries in the last decade (OECD 2004).
However, the general impact of immigrants on
national wage levels is found to be rather small (see
e.g. Borjas et al. 1997 or Friedberg and Hunt 1995).
Capital flows were already very high (relative to
GDP) during the Gold Standard Era. After the
downturn in the interwar period international cap-
ital transactions grew again in the second half of
the 20th century. But pre-World-War-I levels were
only reached again in the 1990s. The unprecedent-
ed characteristic of recent capital market develop-
ment, however, is the steep rise in foreign direct
investment. While in 1990, FDI made up only 
5 percent of gross fixed capital formation on aver-
age,its share rose to about 20 percent at the turn of
the century UNCTAD, FDO Database). This pat-
tern illustrates that investors more than ever have
the global perspective with regard to their invest-
ment decisions.
Labour market flexibility
With globalised markets, price flexibility is the key
issue.Shocks can be more severe and markets need
to adjust to the new equilibrium level. Since the
focus of this discussion lies on the effects of glob-
alisation on labour markets,we want to take a look
at their flexibility in several countries.Labour mar-
ket flexibility is determined by several factors.The
role of trade unions can be mentioned as one of
them. Compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, trade
unions have a stronger influence in many Euro-
pean states. In Scandinavia, trade union density
reaches about 80 percent. However, relocation of
firms or bankruptcy have brought about job losses
and reduced the bargaining position of trade
unions substantially in some countries. Germany,
for example, has seen a decline of union member-
ship by about 40 percent between 1993 and 2001.
That amounts to 4.4 million in total and a density
of 29.7 percent (see www.dgb.de and EIRO, 2004).
Another indication is the coverage rate of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. In Belgium and
France, more than 90 percent of all employees are
affected by such agreements. Germany also ranks
high with 79 percent. In the UK and the US, col-
lective bargaining is much less dominant and
reaches only 39 and 15 percent respectively (Euro-
pean Commission 2003; for US see EEAG 2004).
Although collective bargaining on the sectoral
level is still common in many OECD countries,
many elements in the contracts already allow flex-
ible handling.
Another source of wage rigidity could be minimum
wages. In Anglo-Saxon countries, minimum wages
do not seem to play a large role since they are set
too low to be binding for a large share of employ-
ees. In the US, the UK and Ireland, the share of
employees earning the minimum wage is lower
than 2 percent. In France and Luxembourg, how-
ever, the fraction is substantially higher (about 
15 percent).3 Employment effects of minimum
wages are widely and controversially discussed in
the literature. While Dolado et al. (1996) do not
regard minimum wages as a more serious con-
straint on the labour market than in the 1960s,
Nickell and Bell (1995) and Card et al. (1995)
explain the rise in unemployment rates as trends
against the less-killed in connection with imperfect
wage adjustments.4 However, the overall effect on
employment seems to be rather small.
There is considerable evidence that the generosity
of the benefit system has a negative impact on
employment as unemployment benefits and social
aid create a reservation wage under which the mar-
ket wage cannot adjust (OECD 1994,ch.8;see also
Nickell 1997 and OECD 2002a). The general pic-
ture shows that Anglo-Saxon countries – with the
exception of Canada – have installed the least gen-
erous unemployment benefit scheme. Hence, in
these countries wages can adjust to lower levels
than in many continental European states.
Labour market flexibility is also determined by
strictness of employment regulation. The OECD
(1999) has calculated an indicator comprising
strictness of individual and collective dismissal reg-
ulation and the allowance of temporary work agen-
cies (TWA). The Table summarises the results and
states that Anglo-Saxon countries show the least
regulation of their labour market whereas conti-
nental European states belong to the more regu-
lated countries in this regard.
3 Paternoster (2004),see also European Commission (2003),pp.79-
80. Other studies like OECD (1999) have different figures since
other references are used. However, the ranking basically remains
identical.
4 Card and Krueger (1995) do not find large employment effects of
the federal minimum wage in the US.Although it is difficult to generate one single indi-
cator reflecting the degree of labour market flexi-
bility,the mosaic shows a pattern that Anglo-Saxon
countries regulate least and allow for highest flexi-
bility in various fields.This supports the commonly
stated view that labour markets in continental
Europe are more rigid than in the US or the UK.5
Wage structure, unemployment and gains from
globalisation
How does the integration of China in the world
economy relate to national labour market out-
come? Theory suggests that factor mobility direct-
ly leads to factor price convergence whereas trade
can create factor price equalisation via conver-
gence in commodity prices.If rich OECD countries
integrate their markets, there is only limited pres-
sure on national markets since factor price differ-
entials are rather small. It might only be that the
structure of the economy changes in the sense that
firms merge or grow in order to exploit scale
economies. Welfare gains accrue due to a larger
variety of products available for consumers and
lower goods prices because of cost advantages at
higher output levels. This is the one line of argu-
ment, but it is not the main focus here.The effects
are different if a rich country and a poor country
integrate their markets. Then, wages are much
more affected due to larger factor price differen-
tials. This brings us back to the central question:
What role do institutional labour
market characteristics play in this
case?
Trade
Heckscher-Ohlin type trade mod-
els indicate that trade between
two countries that possess differ-
ent relative factor endowments
(and hence, different marginal
productivities) will equate factor
prices if both countries continue
to produce all goods. Speciali-
sation, however, would prevent
full convergence of wages. The
basic mechanism is that factors of
production are shifted between
national industries to exploit comparative advan-
tages. The country which possesses relatively high
amounts of labour will produce more of the labour-
intensive good in order to export some of it. The
relatively capital-abundant country produces more
of the capital-intensive goods. Thereby, goods
prices will converge and hence, factor prices as
well. Global output is thereby maximised.
Adrian Wood (1994) among others provides evi-
dence that OECD countries import more manufac-
tured goods from low-wage countries relative to
the past. In 1955, only 6 percent of the South’s
exports to the North were manufactured goods.
This share rose to 71 percent in 1989.6 Especially
less skilled workers in the North using labour-
intensive production technologies were affected by
this development. According to the theory, their
wages must fall to sustain employment levels
whereas the marginal return of capital and wage
income of the highly skilled can rise.This creates a
divergence of wage income. If wages cannot fall,
unemployment emerges.
Factor mobility
In the case of vertical FDI,firms will relocate parts
of their production since low wage costs promise
higher profits. As workers in target regions (low-
wage countries) are generally less skilled than in
industrialised countries, firms export the produc-
tion of labour-intensive goods.This, as in the trade
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Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation
Rank Late 1990s Indicator
(0-6) Rank Late 1990s Indicator
(0-6)
1 United States 0.7 16 Slovakia 2.4
2 UnitedKingdom 0.9 17 Belgium 2.5
3 New Zealand 0.9 18 Korea 2.5
4 Canada 1.1 19 Estonia 2.6
5 Ireland 1.1 20 Sweden 2.6
6 Australia 1.2 21 Norway 2.6
7 Switzerland 1.5 22 Germany 2.6
8 Denmark 1.5 23 France 2.8
9 Hungary 1.7 24 Spain 3.1
10 Poland 2.0 25 Italy 3.4
11 Finland 2.1 26 Slovenia 3.5
12 Czech Republic 2.1 27 Greece 3.5
13 Netherlands 2.2 28 Turkey 3.5
14 Japan 2.3 29 Portugal 3.7
15 Austria 2.3
Source: OECD (1999),p. 66; Riboudet al. (2002).
5 Bauer, Bonin and Sunde (2003) argue that wages were rigid in
West Germany between 1976 and 1997.
6 Wood (1994), p. 2. Wood divides the world into rich countries
(North) and poor countries (South).CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 57
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example above, creates the same downward pres-
sure on unskilled wages in the North.One example
is the textile industry that has mostly settled in
Romania and now is again on the move to Ukraine
and other countries with even lower wages.7
Although immigration to OECD countries is
restricted, the share of the foreign-born labour
force has been increasing in the 1990s in all major
countries (OECD 2004 and Eurostat). For
Germany, for instance, the share rose from 7.6 to
8.4 percent between 1992 and 2001. Moreover, for-
eign workers tend to have a lower education than
natives and concentrate in certain sectors of the
economy (OECD 2004). In Germany, about one
third is employed in manufacturing (OECD 2003).
This shows that downwards pressure on wages
might well be substantial in some sectors of the
economy although the share of foreigners in the
labour force is small on an aggregate level.
Inequality versus unemployment
The quintessence of the previous analysis is that rel-
ative wages in industrialised countries have to
increase if wages for less skilled workers come under
pressure and highly skilled employees in these states
tend to benefit from the division of international
labour.Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion of earnings
for France, the United States, Germany and the UK.
as measured by the ratio of the upper limit of the
ninth decile relative to the upper limit of the first
decile of the income distribution. The expected
development can be observed in the United States
and also in the United Kingdom. However, relative
wages stayed relatively constant in France and even
decreased slightly in Germany.
How can this be explained? In France and
Germany, wages in the lower part of the income
distribution could not fall for some reason. Either
minimum wages or other institutional regulations
like benefit payments are usual suspects. Since
Germany has not installed an explicit minimum
wage floor, the expansion of the welfare state
delivers an alternative explanation.8 In fact, social
aid increased by 450 percent since 1970 whereas
industrial real wages increased “only” by 350 per-
cent (Sinn 2004).The wage structure could thus be
compressed. However, pressure from international
competition can never be absorbed by defending
wages or guaranteeing an alternatively high
income. Some adjustment always has to take place.
The residual in this case is unemployment.It is well
known that Germany has experienced a continu-
ous increase in unemployment. In 1970, only
150,000 people were registered as being unem-
ployed.The figure has risen to nearly 4.5 million in
2004.9 The upwards trend was mostly driven by
unemployment of less skilled workers.As Figure 2
shows, unemployment among the poorly educated
is by far the highest in Germany with 15.6 percent.
Many studies blame the welfare state for the
inflexibility of low wages (see e.g. Siebert 1990;
Nickell 1997; OECD 2002a). Especially the high
share of long-term unemployment can be attrib-
uted to long-term generous welfare benefits.This is
the big difference between Germany and Scandi-
navian countries that grant high benefits for the
first months but cut them rigor-
ously thereafter. In Germany,
the share of long-term unem-
ployment in total unemploy-
ment exceeded 50 percent in
2000 (OECD 2002b, p.192).
Who is reaping the gains from
globalisation? If trade and fac-
tor mobility cause unemploy-
ment in the industrialised world,
then potential gains from the
international division of labour
Figure 1
7 With regard to Eastern Europe, one has to admit that also some
R&D departments have been relocated to Eastern European coun-
tries due to lower wages for engineers and other highly skilled
workers.
8 Of course, trade union power can also be
an explanation.
9 Reunification in 1990 has just shifted the
trend-line upwards.are forgone – at least to some extent.10 This result
is straightforward since national income ceteris
paribus must be suboptimal if a fraction of the pro-
duction factors lie idle and can no longer con-
tribute to national income.The size of the cake will
be smaller than it could have been.It is hard to tell,
though, whether net gains from globalisation are
still positive if unemployment emerges. What is
clear, however, is that countries with the most flex-
ible factors (and goods) markets benefit most.
Conclusions and policy implications
I have argued that welfare gains from globalisation
cannot be exploited entirely if labour markets are
inflexible. If global competition creates unemploy-
ment, it is even possible that a country experiences
net welfare losses on an aggregate level. Anglo-
Saxon countries are hence in the best position to
reap the gains from globalisation since their labour
markets were found to be the most flexible ones.In
continental European states, however, generous
benefit payments are regarded as the major cause
for rigidities in the low-wage segment of the wage
distribution.
It seems that economies face the choice between
the pest and cholera.Either a country allows for an
increase in wage inequality to
reap the benefits or it will gen-
erate unemployment – especial-
ly of the unskilled – by keeping
the wage distribution constant.
The latter outcome is only sus-
tainable if the welfare state guar-
antees the unemployed a reason-
able income. However, a small
open economy – and nearly ev-
ery country is relatively small
compared to the rest of the
world – cannot redistribute an
increasing share of the shrinking
cake by levying taxes on the
employed. It seemed to have
worked in Germany and other
European states for the last 30 years. Compared to
1970, however, more low-wage countries are catch-
ing up with the industrialised world and competing
with their highly paid jobs.To avoid a total collapse
of the social insurance system, more wage flexibil-
ity has to be allowed for. It will just not be finan-
cially feasible to distribute unemployment benefits
and social aid to a growing share of the population.
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